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HUMAN / TECHNOLOGY CO-ADAPTATION IN                 
THE CONTEXT OF CYBERSECURITY 
Research paper 
 
Chemsi, Rachid, UNSW, Sydney, Australia, rachid.chemsi@dsfaustralia.com 
Abstract  
 
Understanding human-technology co-adaptation processes is becoming of utmost importance. Co-
adaptation required among various actors is critical for their survival especially in turbulent envi-
ronments such as the cyberspace. Indeed, cyberspace is marked by imminent cyber threats forcing IT 
stakeholders to act promptly, re-enforcing cybersecurity with complex and increasingly intrusive tech-
nologies with significant social impact. Based on a field study where a governmental organization 
(GO) acquired cybersecurity systems; and leveraging a constructive grounded theory extended with 
and abductive research, this study showcases that cybersecurity being as strong as its weakest actor, a 
requirement for a collective successful co-adaptation amongst various actors is of utmost importance. 
A technology-human co-adaptation model is proposed. It is processual in nature, with a holistic reach 
driven inspired by various adaptation dynamics such as power, identity, ethics and technology; that 
are driving the overall co-adaptation. Knowing what it takes for a better co-adaptation will allow cy-
bersecurity stakeholders, managers and practitioners to bring more focus on pre-adaptation efforts 
facilitating the co-adaptation processes therefore allowing the acceleration of the much needed suc-
cess of cybersecurity systems deployments or any other controversial but required technology. 
 
Keywords: Co-Adaptation, Adaptation, Adaptation Dynamics, Cyberspace, Cybersecurity, Surveil-
lance, E-crime, Privacy, Power. 
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1. Introduction 
Adaptation is the prime and general condition of all existence. 
Edgar Morin 
This paper addresses co-adaptation between human and technological actors in the context of 
Information Systems (IS) adoption in a Governmental Organisation (GO). While evolution and 
adaptation have been widely explored in biology, psychology and environment fields, this can’t be 
said for Information Systems (IS). There are nevertheless few notable attempts of examining evolution 
and adaptation between organizations and technologies based on existing IS theories. For instance 
Grabowski and Roberts (2011) applied adaptive structuration theory to study co-adaptation between 
organization and technology; (Richard and Simon 2006) used complex adaptive system theory to 
explain evolution between software and organization, and (Nima Herman et al. 2016) used the activity 
theory to address context driven co-evolvement between tools and practices in organizations. While 
these and other authors (Barley 1986; Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992) made significant contributions 
to understanding the concept of change and interaction between technology and organisations there is 
a paucity of research that explicitly examines and theorizes the concept of adaptation and co-
adaptation among human actors (including organizations) and technologies (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 
2014; Leonardi and Barley 2010).  
While co-adaptation processes are evident in most IS in practice they are particulary critical in 
turbulent environments such as cyberspace where cyber threats are imminent (Kan 2017; Lohrmann 
2016). Cybersecurity counter attacks (Gelbstein 2016) require rapid, profound and integrated 
technological and organizational changes (Andres 2016; Balleste 2016; Delibasis 2016; Kulesza 2016; 
Weber and Staiger 2016) that can only be sustained by an effective and ongoing co-adaptation among 
various involved actors.  
Indeed, increasing number of new security threats and e-crimes has been introduced by the ever 
interconnected digital world showing daily explosion of information and communication technologies 
(Durbin 2016). These threats relate virtually to every aspect of our life including businesses, critical 
infrastructures (Kan 2017) and national security. Cyberattacks on power grids and other significant 
infrastructure made headlines in 2016 (Lohrmann 2016). According to CNBC, an IBM study found 
that ransomware spiked 6,000% in 2016 and most victims paid the hackers; 70 percent of business 
victims paid the hackers to get their data back and  ransomware reached almost $1 billion in 2016 
(Taylor 2016). Attacks in 2017 affected both private and government organizations. The examples 
include attacks on railways systems in Germany, NHS systems in the UK and USA’s 198 millions 
voters data leaked from Amazon servers (Newman 2017). Faced with imminent threats and risks 
becoming higher every day, many organizations are being urged to adopt cybersecurity tools 
(Adelstein 2006; Hay et al. 2009). So much so that cybersecurity has become the focus of most 
governments (Belot 2017). 
This paper aims to advance understanding of co-adaptation processes among technological and social 
actors in the context of cybersecurity by drawing on and extending concepts and theories of adaptation 
from biology and environment studies. This is important for all kinds of organizations but in particular 
for government organizations. This aim is achieved by i) presenting empirical findings and analysis 
from the longitudinal case study of the adoption of cybersecurity technologies in a government 
organization; ii) developing a grounded theory in the form of a model of co-adaptation among 
cybersecurity systems and various social actors (individuals, groups and the organization); and iii) 
dicussing its contribution and future research.  
2. Literature review 
Adaptation as defined by the English dictionary (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/adaptation) means: 
a. the act or process of adapting, or b. the state of being adapted, or c. something, such as a device or 
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mechanism that is changed or changes so as to become suitable to a new or special application or 
situation. The field of origin of adaptation is biology where adaptation is a process by which an animal 
or plant species becomes fitted to its environment (Gittleman 2017). Henri Laborit introduced the idea 
that, if a being lives and reproduces, it is because it has adjusted its biological functions to its external 
conditions (Simonet 2010). Adaptation was also widely studied in climate change and psychology 
sciences (Hoffmann 2011; Maner and Kenrick 2010; Pelling 2011; Wilson et al. 2008).   
In the IS literature, there were attempts to theorize mutual influences between an IS and its organizing 
context which addressed adaptation in an indirect or incomplete manner (Grabowski and Roberts 
2011; Richard and Simon 2006; Vessey and Ward 2013). Furthermore, the evolutionary theory has 
been used to study organization survival by continuously adapting technology (Ahire 2000; Anderson 
and Tushman 1990; Arnott 2004; Cragg and King 1993; Piccoli et al. 2004). However these studies 
have been critiqued for one-sided theorizing of technology adaptation while not considering changes 
made by human actors to adapt to technology (Helin et al. 2014b). Other theories such as the 
structuration theory of technology (Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992), technology imperative models 
(Markus and Robey 1988), the strategic choice model (Child 1997), and the model of technology-
triggered structural change (Barley 1986) focused with various degrees on interactions between human 
agents, technology and structures. They attempted to explain how technology shapes and is shaped by 
institutions and the role of human agent in this process. While adaptation was implicitly addressed by 
studying changes to structures and technology, what was kept silent in these theories is the co-
adaptation and co-evolution that human and nonhuman actors go through during these interactions. In 
other words, the central process of co-adaptation contextually linking, constructing, transforming and 
deconstructing various human and technological actors wasn’t explicitly addressed.  
The understanding of the co-adaptation processes is particularly critical in the case of rapidly changing 
environments characterized by shocks and turbulences that are threatening the very existence of 
organisations and institutions.  For IS, cybersecurity threats are a paradigmatic example. Organizations 
need to be continuously on alert in order to protect IT infrastructure, minimize cyberattacks risks and 
counter attacking daily renewed threats. According to Gartner: "Cybersecurity encompasses a broad 
range of practices, tools and concepts related closely to those of information and operational 
technology security. Cybersecurity is distinctive in its inclusion of the offensive use of information 
technology to attack adversaries" (Walls et al. 2013). Example of such cybersecurity tools are security 
information and events management technologies such as HPE ArcSight, IBM’s QRadar, Intel 
Security McAfee Enterprise Security, EventTracker and BlackStratus’s LOGStorm (Mello Jr 2016). 
The implementation and use of such cybersecurity tools and systems have been studied in IS from a 
technical perspective (Cohen et al. 2011; Gelbstein 2016; Hunton 2009; Turner 2007). It has also been 
studied from the social perspective focusing on intrusiveness, surveillance and power disruption 
(Andres 2016; Balleste 2016; Coudert 2010; D'Arcy et al. 2009; Delibasis 2016; Weber and Staiger 
2016). The importance of addressing the human factor in cybersecurity has been increasingly 
acknowledged. “No matter how advanced technology seems to get or how many cyberthreats emerge, 
it all comes down to people—real, individual people” (O'Rourke 2017). Tanium in its report showed 
that 91% of existing executive employees still lacking basic knowledge on how to read and interpret 
cybersecurity reports (Olver 2016). The same report gives some alarming figures illustrating that 
cybersecurity is not being well handled within organisations. These problems were identified in both 
cybersecurity awareness and in cybersecurity readiness folds.  
Although these studies reveal numerous technological and human/social aspects of the implementation 
and use of cybersecurity systems they have not addresses the mutual adaptation of the social and the 
technological. In the digital world with increasing frequency, sophistication and ruthlessness of 
cyberattacks it is not only cybersecurity technology that must continuously advance but the whole 
technology-organization complex has to continuously co-adapt to prevent and counteract the attacks. 
There is a gap in the IS literature in understanding these complex processes of co-adaptation between 
various heterogeneous (human, social and technological) actors. To address it this paper seeks to 
answer the following research question: how do human and technological actors change and co-adapt 
in turbulent and complex environments? The question is answered by drawing from a longitudinal 
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case study of the adoption of cybersecurity systems in a government organization using grounded 
theory methodology that is discussed next. 
3. Research site and methodology 
To explore co-adaptation between human/social actors and technology and answer the research 
question we chose the case of cybersecurity systems that was introduced by the Cybersecurity Centre 
of a Middle-Eastern African country to provide cybersecurity of all governmental digital 
infrastructures.  Initially, in 2010 cybersecurity systems operated within the Ministry of New 
Technologies and then in 2013 transferred to the Ministry of Defence. The creation of the 
Cybersecurity Centre at a national level and implementation of cybersecurity systems resulted from a 
cybersecurity partnership with an industrialized country that had already its equivalent centre in 
operational mode. Cybersecurity systems were deployed and gradually integrated with all 
governmental IT infrastructures in order to provide comprehensive cybersecurity protection. The 
project went through major phases since its inception in 2010 and was still running after the end of this 
research in 2014 (Figure 1). 
The Ministry of New Technologies consisted of several departments, including the Department of 
Digital Trust and the IS Department. Under the Department of IS, the IS Division comprised several 
IS services: Network and Security Service, Assets Management Service, Governance and Regulation 
Service, and Software Development Service. The GO witnessed several changes and adaptation to its 
structure and roles throughout the project of cybersecurity systems acquisition, implementation and 
use.  
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Figure 1:  Historical Overview of the Cybersecurity Project 
Phase 1 consisted of the initial cybersecurity systems acquisition and implementation lead by the De-
partment of Digital Trust. When cybersecurity systems were implemented it was agreed that it will be 
the responsibility of the Department of IS and integrated with existing IT infrastructure. In particular, 
the Network and Security Service team was responsible of its integration with the entire IT infrastruc-
ture managed by the Ministry of New Technologies. As part of this implementation the Department of 
IS worked closely with one main security vendor which provided the appropriate training to its staff.  
Phase 2 was marked by the migration of the Cybersecurity Centre to the Ministry of Defence. For this 
purpose a new unit, The Department of National Information Security has been created along with its 
appropriate divisions.  As part of this Department, the Cybersecurity Division was responsible for the 
operation of the Cybersecurity Centre and the relationship with the cybersecurity vendors. In some 
sense, this phase can be seen as an attempt to increase security awareness and strategic importance of 
cybersecurity systems by granting the ownership of the Cybersecurity Centre and the responsibility for 
the cybersecurity project to the Ministry of Defence. 
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Phase 3 involved complex organizational change in GO (in particular in the Ministry of New 
Technologies and the Ministry of Defence) as a result of the changing responsibility for cybersecurity 
and specifically cybersecurity systems. There was also a release of a new cybersecurity technology 
that had to be implemented. In order to facilitate the communication between the two ministries and 
the migration of the cybersecurity systems in 2014 a new unit was created under the Department of 
Digital Trust. The key role of the new unit was to liaise between the two ministries – facilitate 
knowledge sharing and transfer of knowhow and experience. In addition a new vendor was hired to 
implement newly released cybersecurity systems and tools.  
As part of a security team in the Cybersecurity Centre, the author spent sixteen months (from May 
2013 to September 2014 in the field as a full participant. This allowed him to conduct an in-depth 
longitudinal case study: observe first-hand what was going on in the GO, engage with staff in work 
processes and informal conversations, observe changes going on in different departments, review 
documents (including archived records and reviews), inspect the technology (cybersecurity systems) 
and its performance, and formally interviewing members from different units. 30 in-depth formal 
interviews were conducted with 17 key actors: 9 project participants, 5 senior managers and 3 middle 
managers (13 of them are interviewed twice). They represented the majority of the key actors in the 
project. Notes from observations, informal discussions and documents comprise 11000 words. Thanks 
to access to important actors, technology and documentation from multiple sources the data collected 
are extensive and rich.  
Data analysis followed Grounded Theory approach by Charmaz (GT) (Charmaz 2014). The analysis of 
data started during the field study and in turn informed data collection, especially interviews. 
Interviews were in-depth and unstructured to allowed new ideas and themes to flow and questions to 
emerge in relation to new categories and themes. After the completion of data collection, the analysis 
of data continued first through open-coding using qualitative analysis software NVivo. The analysis 
and comparison of open codes lead to formulation of categories and then to identification central 
themes. Relationships among the codes were recorded in memos and later used during theory building 
(Charmaz 2014; Corbin 2015; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Furthermore, potential relationships were 
hypothesised along the way and tested against collected data following an abduction process (or in 
other words, seeking ‘inference to the best explanation’) (Bryman 2015; Douven 2011). The abductive 
reasoning also engaged theories that could help explain the complex changes of organization structure, 
power relations, work practices, professional identities, technological changes and their ongoing 
mutual influences. In this sense, theory development was in the final stage informed by evolutionary 
theory and the concept of co-adaptation. Seeing the observed complex processes of cybersecurity 
systems implementation in GO as processes of adaptation and co-adaptation turned out to be the best 
explanation.  
4. Findings and Analysis:  
Resulting from the GT analysis (Charmaz 2014), the story of cybersecurity systems implementation 
during the 3 phases, is presented as a series of events (round shapes) and experiences (square shapes) 
summarized in Figure 2. Arrows illustrate their interconnections. Both events and experiences are col-
our coded to indicate which phase they pertain to. Also, interconnections are numbered from 1 to 3 
indicating the respective phase. 
The following analysis briefly describes adaptation dynamics including co-adaptation processes in 
which various human and technology actors act and thus change the situational context. The changes 
in the situational context prompt adaptation dynamics of different actors and so on. Due to space 
limitation we present here only illustrative examples of these co-adaptation processes. 
During all phases, there was shared awareness by all human actors of the cyber threats and the 
agreement on the enforcement of cybersecurity as well as the need for collaboration between all 
involved actors. In phase 1 managers of the Ministry of New Technologies were particularly 
concerned with cyber threats as they held direct responsibility for cyber protection of the GO. The 
implementation of cybersecurity systems was considered of highest importance and critical to 
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cybersecurity as one of the managers explained: “It is very important and we needed it especially with 
all what we hear about from security breaches, high hackers’ activities and the risk they are present-
ing... Imagine the government infrastructure has been attacked and confidential information has been 
stolen, the consequences could be immeasurable on both material and immaterial levels. So, definitely 
a Centre to monitor all activities in order to protect and detect is a very good idea” (Senior Manager 
#3). This was indicated on the diagram by the category of “Criticality of Cybersecurity and Necessity 
of Cooperation” that was relevant across all phases.  
Managers & Practitioners:
Full Solution Support in 
Design and Implementation
Managers: 
Realisation of Sensitivity and 
High Risk by National Security 
Stakeholders
Managers and Practitioners: 
Experience of better Security 
Power and Control 
Managers: 
Move 
Cybersecurity 
Centre to the 
Ministry of Defence
Managers & Practitioners: Criticality of CyberSecurity and Necessity of Cooperation
Managers & 
Practitioners: 
Cybersecurity 
Systems Upgrade
Managers:
Creation of a 
Local Liaison
Practitioners: Improved 
but Partial Adaptation to 
Cybersecurity Systems
Practitioners: Experiencing Privacy Issues
Practitioners: Loss of Security Control Benefits
Practitioners: Feeling Dis-Empowered and Marginalised
Practitioners: Becoming Under Surveillance
Practitioners: Solution Being Resisted and Not Fully Supported
Practitioners: Security Measures Compromised
Managers: Run Cybersecurity Centre from the Ministry of Defence
Practitioners: Adapting 
Poorly to Cybersecurity 
Systems
1
1
1
1
2
2
2 and 3
2 and 3
2 and 3
2 and 3
2 and 3
3
3
2 and 3
Phase1
Initial Implementation
Phase 2
Strengthening Security
Phase 3
Co-Adaptation Phase
Practitioners: Softening Stands on 
Surveillance and Business Process 
Issues
Category manifested in 
Phase 1
Category manifested in 
Phase 2
Category manifested in 
Phase 3
Legend:
 
Figure 2:  Co-Adaptation View of the Processes Involved in three Phases (developed using GT)  
During phase 1, cybersecurity systems were implemented by a third party vendor with a full 
cooperation of the Ministry of New Technologies security team members. The security team was 
excited and was looking forward to operating the new system. The IT team collaborated with all the 
actors related to cybersecurity systems and also undertook the required trainings. “It was very exciting 
(experience) as we were able to access the server dashboard and we were able to run different reports 
and monitor traffic ourselves. It is our environment and we are responsible of making it as secure as 
possible, any tools that could help us detect threats and attacks and protect our IT assets were very 
welcome. We really needed a comprehensive tool that allows us viewing what is being exchanged on 
our network and cybersecurity solution sounds as the perfect answer to this…” (Middle Manager #1). 
This could be explained by that they were already adapted to security tasks and roles. This means that 
we witnessed the introduction of technologies into a structure that is pre-adapted to the nature of 
threats these technologies addressed. It is important to note that power structures haven’t been affected 
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at that time; teams’ identities haven’t been influenced and hence no major change or adaptation was 
required by any of the actors. One fact has changed though, it is the level of power and control that the 
security team had and that was strongly increased by the ownership of cybersecurity solution centre. 
In Phase 1, the security team had then a greater power and control that allowed access to GO’s private 
and confidential data. Moreover, this access could be broadened beyond the particular GO the security 
team reports to when cybersecurity systems would be integrated with subsequent GOs of the country. 
The National Security Committee felt that there was a security risk regarding the initial setup of 
cybersecurity systems project and wanted a stricter control of it. It decided to revoke the ownership of 
Cybersecurity Centre by the Ministry of New Technologies and grant it instead to a military of 
Ministry of Defence. This marked the start of a new phase of the adaptation process in the project that 
is indicated in the diagram above as “Phase 2: Strengthening Security”. We can describe this structural 
change as an adaptation process in response to the assessment of cyber risk by the National Security 
Committee. By adapting to this risk, the National Security Committee acted upon the actual situational 
context of the project which is shared by various other human and technology actors. Indeed, the 
change to the situational context is described by the 2 categories: “Move Cybersecurity Centre to the 
Defence Ministry” and “Run Cybersecurity Centre from the Defence Ministry”. This made the IT 
team in particular to be under watch as showed by the category “Becoming Under Surveillance”. This 
was a real concern as an IT team member explained: “I'm not comfortable having or knowing that 
someone is watching or listening to every single action I do. I like my privacy”.  
Furthermore, it made not only the security team lose the benefits of Cybersecurity Centre but added a 
parallel entity (Cybersecurity Centre at Ministry of Defence) sharing the security responsibility of the 
Ministry of New Technologies and intervening in the security team role. This had implications for the 
security team as expressed by  staff member: “We don’t identify ourselves as the main security team 
anymore; all teams receive cybersecurity systems reports and think they report to cybersecurity sys-
tems regarding security tasks...Security decisions were made by us for us, now a third party got in-
volved and taking over this” (Security Practitioner #1). This created new reality on the ground that 
modified the context in which teams in the Ministry of New Technologies were working. The enacted 
changes to this context triggered several adaptation processes related to various actors namely the 
security team and IT team. It made them engaged in several adaptation dynamics of both the social 
and technical nature. The categories “Experiencing Privacy Issues” and “Feeling Dis-empowered and 
Marginalized” reflects these dynamics. As employees in the Ministry of New Technologies (especially 
the IT team and security team) felt being under surveillance, they expressed increasing awareness of 
being watched and concerns of being exposed and embarrassed. In particular Manager #7 explained, 
with cybersecurity systems in place, professional mistakes would be known to everyone, inside and 
outside the Ministry of New Technologies: “…before, if there is an incident, it could be hidden; now it 
is not the case as everyone will know about it. Before, it could be hidden even at the lowest of the hi-
erarchy and sometimes even the immediate manager will not know about it”. The IT team was also 
asked to deal with technical issues that cybersecurity systems detected, but felt powerless since it was 
impossible to fix some of them “we can’t (comply with cybersecurity systems) because it means we 
have to start new projects for upgrades and we can't do that… the people who used to work on this 
applications are already gone. We only do maintenance of these applications. Some of them are so old 
we won’t be able find the proper people to upgrade them” explained a System Administrator #5. 
Moreover, the security team experienced a mixture of dynamics, those that are related to their roles 
and identities while being responsible for security within the Ministry of New Technologies and those 
that are related to being controlled and watched by an entity outside of the Ministry. They were subject 
to role change and experienced secrecy and mistrust from some actors: “Unfortunately once the solu-
tion was put in place and ownership was passed to the Ministry of Defence, our access to the dash-
board was blocked. We couldn’t even have web interface to monitor our own traffic or even know 
what is being watched about us” said Senior Manager #3. This deprived local practitioner from 
monitoring rights at local traffic of their network. Some security practitioners also felt that their role 
and career objective became misaligned “it reduced our jobs to execution of instructions. For me, the 
most interesting part of my job was the daily challenges, the meetings, brainstorming and the solution 
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design…Now all the fun is gone; all we do is get to the reports and try to execute instructions.” 
security practitioner #5 explained. What made things even worse was that the communication from the 
Cybersecurity Centre to the Ministry of New Technologies was unilateral and that their security teams 
weren’t coordinating security tasks with each other. 
The analysis at this stage suggests that various actors were engaged in several social and technical 
dynamics that relate mainly to trust, roles and responsibilities, power/resistance, identity, technology 
and ethics. These adaptation dynamics drove the adaptation of each actor or the co-adaptation of all of 
them. The adaptation of the Ministry of New Technologies practitioners to the cybersecurity systems 
project setup was poor. The level of communication and cooperation with Cybersecurity Centre was 
very low as explained by Senior. Manager #3: “It is easier to interact with civilians even at the gov-
ernmental level. The military follows strict rules. They are very rigid and communication with them is 
almost impossible. Errors are not tolerated”. There were many dis-coordination issues and rejection of 
responsibility. Role confusion and competition between the Ministry of New Technologies’ security 
team and Cybersecurity Centre left many security tasks compromised. The power of the Ministry of 
New Technologies and especially its security team had diminished and their role of enforcement and 
control; along with its image within the GO; have been undermined. This was illustrated in the 
diagram by the category “Adapting Poorly to cybersecurity systems”. The outcome of this poor 
adaptation got manifested in several signs of resistance among practitioners ending up in not 
supporting the cybersecurity systems solution.  “I tried to get them (members of my team) involved in 
discussing the cybersecurity systems reports on many occasions, the attitude is very negative. They 
don't want to talk about it” mentioned Senior Manager #6 who manages several IT practitioners not 
involved in cybersecurity systems project. The categories “Solution Being Resisted and Not Fully 
Supported” and “Security Measures Compromised” illustrate this outcome in the diagram. 
The outcome of this poor adaptation and resistance affected the situational context of the project and 
got the attention of management of the Department of Digital Trust that were keen to making the 
project a success and ultimately defend the Ministry of New Technologies and promote cybersecurity 
systems experience. In phase 3, the social and technical problems that the Ministry of New 
Technologies practitioners were facing and their actions/inactions were noted by management of the 
Department of Digital Trust.  As a result more adaptation dynamics took place between several actors 
of the project. Practitioners have realized that technology was an issue and they had to adapt to it. 
Mangers on the other hand realised they had to adapt the technology. Therefore they’ve decided along 
with Ministry of Defence to enforce cybersecurity systems with newer and more powerful 
technologies that would be easier to use. Thus new cybersecurity systems tools were acquired, sensors 
and points of integration with the Ministry of New Technologies infrastructure became easier to 
manage by the IT team primarily because they became software based. Generated cybersecurity 
systems reports became more targeted, addressing more precisely and specifically the applications 
being ran by the Ministry of New Technologies. Time to perform security task was improved due to 
unprecedented storage capacity and events reconstruction time. 
Beside this technical adaptation, there was an organizational adaptation. Management realized the 
tasks miss-coordination and communication issues between cybersecurity systems and the Ministry of 
New Technologies. They’ve then decided to create a new entity within the Ministry to play the role of 
a Liaison between Cybersecurity Centre and the Ministry. This organizational adaptation tried to 
control the flaws of communication and coordination between them. However for the practitioners in 
the Ministry it only increased the complexity of communication since there was a new actor involved 
that was in the Ministry but didn’t belong to the IT team. “The Department of IS is not happy about 
the Department of Digital Economy. The latter is supposed to be at the same level in the hierarchy; 
however the Department of Digital Economy is now driving the show (regarding cybersecurity sys-
tems) … and now electing a liaison among its facility to oversee cybersecurity systems operations...” 
said Senior Manager #1 from the Department of IS. Again by trying to adapt to previously affected 
situational context, management of the Ministry of New Technologies took actions related to both 
technical and organizational aspects, thus affecting the situational context of relevance to other 
players. Mainly the security and IT practitioners within Ministry of New Technologies had now to 
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assess and attempt to adapt to new context. The actions of management are illustrated in the diagram 
by the 2 categories: “Creation of a Local Liaison” and “cybersecurity systems technology Upgrade”.  
Regardless of these changes by management, the practitioners of the Ministry of New Technologies 
were still involved in previous adaptation dynamics as described in Phase 2. These changes solved 
neither the issues their security team experienced regarding their role and identity as a team, nor the 
issues of the control and power that has been shifted by the restructuring of the Cybersecurity Centre. 
Likewise privacy issues were still persistent and the new changes didn’t solve them. However they’ve 
assisted few employees to change their minds, soften their opinions and making them adapt to the new 
cybersecurity systems context. They’ve been more willing to accept the situation and to do what was 
needed to assist with the project. Other members of the security team facing this situation couldn’t 
adapt and preferred to leave the team, thus ending their roles of security specialists in the Ministry of 
New Technologies. In addition, several technical difficulties were still encountered preventing full 
security compliance. Simply speaking, some technologies were too old and couldn’t be adapted to new 
requirements. This was captured in the diagram by the category “Improved but partial adaptation to 
cybersecurity systems”.  
In sum, in this last phase, the co-adaptation between technology, management and practitioners 
became more pronounced and clear. Co-adaptation of practitioners reached breaking points when few 
practitioners couldn’t adapt and left the organization or their team. But in few other cases, 
practitioners changed their stands on moral issues especially regarding privacy and co-adapted by 
deciding to support the project. Technology was adapted to deal with various technical limitations and 
challenges; the same applies to the Ministry of New Technologies organization structure that was 
modified to deal with coordination and communication issues. These two actions reflect management 
co-adaptation process to technology and to practitioners. It also reflects technology co-adaptation to 
organizational and practitioners issues. The overall co-adaptation was still weak and the Ministry of 
New Technologies security was still compromised. 
To summarize this analysis, during the cybersecurity systems acquisition, implementation and use 
there were numerous actors involved. The contextual situation of the project makes actors engage in 
co-adaptation process. Each actor is subject to project situational context and tries to adapt to the 
changes enacted by the other actors in the context by taking certain actions. This co-adaptation process 
is driven by adaptation dynamics of the social and technological nature. Social dynamics identified 
involve power, ethics, identity and technologies. The process is an ongoing and continuous one 
regardless of the adaptation phase. Thus, from this analysis and while focusing on the main concept of 
adaptation of different human and technology actors, we could notice that these high level categories 
relate to either situational context, adaptation process, adaptation dynamics and actors’ actions. 
5. Discussion 
The case of cybersecurity systems acquisition, implementation and use presents an example of co-
adaptation of human and technological actors in a turbulent and complex environment. As evidenced 
from our analysis above, actors act upon the situational context. The situational context changes in 
turn trigger adaptation dynamics of different actors. These dynamics lead to a certain degree of adapta-
tion of affected actors; adaptation of actors itself is reflected back to the situational context either as-
sisting or impeding the accomplishment and success of the project and so on. Extending the GT analy-
sis and theorizing by an abductive theory building led to a new co-adaptation model. As a result, the 
presentation of co-adaptation processes in the concrete case of the GO acquisition, appropriation and 
use of cybersecurity systems in Figure 2 is generalized further and presented in Figure 3 below. Figure 
3 presents the co-adaptation processes among the main actors – cybersecurity systems, managers, and 
practitioners – in the situational context. As these actors continually change and co-adapt as part of 
situation context, the adaptation dynamics involves power reconfiguration, identity changes, technolo-
gy (IT infrastructure) changes, and ethical concerns and responses (only briefly analysed above due to 
space limitations).  
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Figure 3:  Human/Technology Co-Adaptation Model 
This represents a new process model of human-technology co-adaptation. It is defined as the survival 
process of human actors offering the ability to adjust to challenging situational contexts by using and 
adapting technology, the process by which various actors (human and nonhuman) of cybersecurity 
systems engage in its constitution but also in reconstitution of social structures by introducing new 
sociomaterial realities. This new model helps to explain the mutual co-constitution between 
cybersecurity systems and human actors within the social and technical context through co-adaptation 
dynamics. It helps us demonstrate how the cybersecurity systems implementation, use and adaptation 
draw from, and impact on, social relations by generating various social and technical adaptation 
dynamics in the organization continuously fuelling actors’ co-adaptation. 
Unlike extent adaptation and evolution theories, the co-adaptation process introduced here is 
multidirectional. Adaptation is not a change of an actor to fit an environment; nor are forces exercised 
upon an actor a natural selection process according to the Darwinian account (Bock 1980). Instead, it 
is a co-adaptation process that involves multiple actors adjusting to each other in their complex and 
uncertain context. In other words each actor is part of other actors’ environments; and change might 
take place in all involved actors as an outcome of this co-adaptation process. Natural selection process 
is not applicable as co-adaptation here is a result of all actors exerting forces upon each other during 
the adaptation dynamics. 
This process model hence presents distinct dynamics driving co-adaptation between technology, 
practitioners and managers and ultimately organizations. Each of these actors is adapting to changing 
situational context and is also part of the adaptation dynamics driving other actors’ adaptations and so 
on. Adaptation is a process of becoming of each actor (human or technological) that ensures 
survivability in a given situation. The becoming of each actor is different depending on the nature of 
the actor and its capacity to cange and adapt. 
In case of technology actors, adaptation aims for viability of an actor. Adaptation is fuelled and driven 
by various adaptation dynamics of other actors as part of the situational context. An actor adaptation to 
the situational context is influenced by adaptation dynamics created either accidently or intentionally 
as tactics or a strategy belonging to the same actor or different actors.  
Actors in the becoming are part of these contexts. Situational Context could also be seen as a set of 
social and material (technological) actors that could constitute an intake of adaptation dynamics or be 
part of the outcome of the adaptation driven by these dynamics or both. Adaptation assumes 
modification and change. It is driven and enacted by actors, but conditioned and limtied by situational 
context. It is in-line with process thinking as it explains actors (or entities) in terms of recurring 
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interactions of events dynamics (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2016). It is a continuous, open ended process, 
sustaining survival or viability of actors. The adaptation trajectory or path can be of outmost historical 
value in studying the archaeology of experiences making adaptation also as an explanation and 
necessity for evolution (Maner and Kenrick 2010). 
We define an actor adaptation dynamics as the forces or the energy aiming to guarantee the actor’s 
survival by producing change in the actor’s becoming or situational context or both. The actor’s 
situational context includes all actors with wich it is connected or by which it is influenced. These 
dynamics relate to various social concepts such as: power, resistance, ethics, agency, knowledge, 
actions, discourses, partnerships, memberships, associations, subjectivation, control, discipline, 
strategies, tactics, and politics. They are relational by nature. They are subject to interpretation and 
intentions and do overlap and co-construct each-others. In the case of cybersecurity systems, main 
social dynamics identified related to power, identity, technology and ethics where negotiations of 
these dynamics took place between several groups and individuals.  
An actor’s adaptation situational context is subject to simultaneous influences from different 
adaptation dynamics belonging to actors of various natures. These influences can collide, compete or 
synergize. Situational context is influenced when the outcome of these dynamics is concretized or 
enacted making the situational context sociomaterial in nature. Concretization of the change doesn’t 
mean necessarily it has been formalized or institutionalized; it can be of an informal nature 
(workarounds, informal role playing, informal teaming, values pretention…etc.). Likewise, situational 
context change can be undeclared which could be captured by the politics dynamics. In the 
cybersecurity project, the double stand of some middle managers is one example. They they sided up 
formaly with senior managers; but informaly with practitioners resisting the implementation.  
Adaptation type depends on the type of the actor. We can differentiate between 2 distinct types for 
adaptation: technology adaptation and human adaptation. Technology adaptation is the process of 
technology modification by an individual or group of individuals in order to achieve some goals (e.g. 
desirable funcitonality). Human adaptation is self-driven as individuals or groups face all kind of 
challenges and make several adjustments to their behaviour and take actions while being engaged in 
several dynamics (adaptation dynamics) at the same time seeking to attain their own goals. This would 
mean sustaining the survival of the actor (an individual) or a group it identifies as. Human adaptation 
can involve one or more technology adaptations. In order to adapt to a certain situation, an actor will 
adapt one or more technology tools to assist him/her with this adaptation. In a bigger scheme, 
technology adaptations serve human adaptations. Technology adaptation ensures the actor’s viability 
in performing the desired functions and providing reasons for its appreciation and retention by actors 
that are its stakeholders (individuals or group of individuals). 
A human actor is constantly engaged in a set of networks of adaptation dynamics. This engagement 
requires constant negotiation within the actor himself and with other actors as well (Emirbayer 1997). 
An example of self-negotiation is the questioning of one’s values and ethics and the possibility of 
giving up ground on certain believes or principles or the opposite by taking a harsher stand on certain 
believes and values or may be even adopting new ones. This constitutes the moral and ethics 
adaptation dynamics. When this self-negotiation ends up with a change in the actor’s believes and 
moral, this could affect his/her overall adaptation process making the actor adapted to new context and 
ultimately assuring his/her survival. This was the case when few employees changed their view on 
privacy invasion by cybersecurity systems.  
Similar to moral and ethics adaptation dynamics, agency adaptation dynamics involved negotiation 
with other actors and can lead to new agency stand for example. Going through agency dynamics in an 
organization, an actor can accept new role he/she will be playing in the organization structure in order 
to satisfy goals of different actors (for instance, becoming a security proxy of the cybersecurity centre 
in the Ministry of New Technologies). Likewise, the change in agency stand affects the actor’s whole 
adaptation process in a way that could ensure the actor’s survival. The way these two types of 
adaptation dynamics co-affect the adaptation process of the actor differs depending on whether the 
dynamics overlap, collide or synergize. In other terms, these dynamics co-construct each other. As an 
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example, the ethics and moral dynamics can prevent the agency dynamics from reaching a certain 
outcome. Likewise, changes in ethics and moral dynamics can get rid of a deadlock in the agency 
dynamics and together generate a positive adaptation outcome. What was said about moral and ethics 
and agency dynamics can be said about all sorts of adaptation dynamics. It is a certain co-construction 
of these dynamics along with the corresponding unfolding timing of it that will lead to a better 
adaptation or not. 
Technology adaptation is the change of technology in order to include and/or exclude certain features 
to be used in a certain manner with an expected performance in order to accommodate the 
requirements of human actors in a particular context. Human actors have power over technology but 
the opposite is true as well. These changes to technology is can be seen as tactics used by human 
actors in order to ensure their own adaptation to their context. If outcome is achieved more or less as 
expected, the human actors would apprehend that their survivability was sustained by relying among 
other factors on technology. On the other side, adaptation of technology in such manner to assist 
human actors to survive justifies and demonstrates the role it plays as an actor and hence sustains its 
viability and retention. During cybersecurity systems project, technology has been upgraded and new 
tools acquired and put to use, making the overall integration more complex. 
The power that technology has over human actors is can be seen as offering them allowances and 
opportunities to better engage in social experiences, and also presenting them with specific constraints. 
Technology has specific instructions to be followed during its operations and has limitations on what it 
can do, when it can do it and how it will do it. The scope reach of technology and the time required to 
fulfil such reach represents its limitations and at the same time limitations to human actors depending 
on it as well. However technology doesn’t have goals of its own. The power it has over human actors 
making them doing things in a certain way it is either a reflection of power of different human actors 
who have designed, configured and implemented this technology in a specific and strategic manner in 
order to satisfy their goals and preferences (Foucault 1981), or this power is accidently and inevitably 
presented by the technology due to its intrinsic technical nature requiring certain ways of operations 
and careful dealing with random and unpredictable technical faults if and when they happen. 
Exactly as adaptation to climate change, in the example of cybersecurity, actors’ adaptations are 
interdependent. Indeed, cybersecurity is a collective matter and it is as strong as its weakest actor, it is 
only with successful negotiations among various social adaptation dynamics that a successful 
adaptation of each actor would take place allowing successful deployment of the solutions. In fact, co-
adaptation is a collective process. Organization adaptation success depends on how each and every 
individual actor adapts. It needs to be said that even though these adaptations are affecting each other, 
every actor’s adaptation to situational context is distinct and subject to local interpretation (Cecez-
Kecmanovic 2004). On the other hand, even if some actors’ adaptation is successful, a failed 
adaptation of an actor who is critical can lead to a series of failed adaptations. As an example, 
technology being an actor, failure of legacy technology to be adapted and integrated with 
cybersecurity systems posed high risk to the whole project and could be seen as jeopardising 
practitioners, managers and the GO adaptation to hostile cyberspace. From the theoretical model, 
failure of an actor adaptation means a change in the situational context of related actors whereby they 
can or cannot adapt to such a change. 
Nonadaptation of an actor might lead to its end. In the case where the new role didn’t align with a 
practitioner’ career goal, the practitioner couldn’t accept the role reduction and the adaptation was just 
impossible and has led to the end of this actor. 
Adaptation outcome depends on the level of adaptability of the actor and the time taken by this 
adaptation process. Some adaptations take a longer time and might just happen too late to ensure 
survivability, for instance when one of the Ministry of New Technologies service team decided to 
improve communication with cybersecurity centre but after key practitioners who’ve complained 
about the communication problems have already left the organisation. This leads us to talk about 
adaptation timing and sequence of a certain set of adaptation dynamics with a certain set of 
interpretations by various actors, and a certain set of actions executed in certain intended and 
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unintended ways by various actors combined with the context of a particular situation. Adaptation 
constitutes timing and at the same time is subject to timing. Good timing leads to good adaptation and 
the opposite is true. Timing of unfolding of these influences marks the outcome of these influences on 
the situational context. 
Finally, co-adaptation becomes more relevant and critical when there is an unfavourable situational 
context threatening the existence of the actors. When situational context is favourable, there is no need 
for adaptation. That was the case where the Security team in the Ministry of New Technologies was 
granted the security tool. We can also read it in that case that the actor is already adapted or pre-
adapted to the situation which leads us to include the concept of pre-adaptation to this discussion. 
6. Conclusion 
While adaptation was addressed in several disciplines such as biology and climate studies, the same 
couldn’t be said for IS. Adaptation and co-adaptation of the human/social and the technological in IS 
was implicitly acknowledged but lacked explicit theorizing and conceptualization. This study makes a 
contribution to IS literature by theorizing the processes by which human and technological actors 
change and co-adapt in turbulent and complex environments. Based on the longitudinal case study of 
the deployment, implementation and use of cybersecurity systems in a Government Organization, this 
paper first demonstrates the existence of several adaptation dynamics that drive the overall co-
adaptation. These dynamics relate to power dynamics between different involved cybersecurity stake-
holders; to identity dynamics taking place within the local security team; to ethical dynamics triggered 
by the invasive nature of cybersecurity technologies; and to technology dynamics posed by technical 
requirements of cybersecurity technologies and need of integration with existing technologies. Second 
part of the answer was provided by demonstrating that all actors were continuously involved in these 
adaptation dynamics and this involvement led to an overall co-adaptation. The proposed holistic theo-
retical co-adaptation model while focusing on processes such as adaptation and adaptation dynamics. 
Co-adaptation process is the focal point of this model where all actors linked to their contextual situa-
tions are being continuously constructed, transformed or deconstructed.  
This paper puts emphasis on the co-adaptation process and demonstrates its central position in the 
happening and becoming of events and actors while highlighting the role of the evolution and becom-
ing of the context on one hand and resisting dualism advocated by several IS theories on the other 
(Child 1997; Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 2003). The GT study of cybersecurity systems acquisition, 
implementation and use in a GO allowed the capture of several concepts related to co-adaptation such 
as pre-adaptation, adaptation, adaptation dynamics, co-construction of adaptation dynamics, timing 
within and of adaptations, situational contexts and adaptation sensitivity to contexts, dependencies 
between adaptations and importance of collective adaptations outcome for an overall co-adaptation 
success. This model could be used as a theoretical lens to study eco-change in any phenomenon by 
examining co-adaptation process and adaptation dynamics driving it. From the practical angle, under-
standing these processes (co-adaptation and adaptation dynamics) will assist in efforts identifying co-
adaptation required among various human and technology actors during new adoptions. As a conse-
quence it will also serve pre-adaptation exercise in order to facilitate new rules, structures, technology 
acceptance, before even its acquisition. This is particularity critical in the case of controversial but re-
quired technological acquisition which is very likely to cause undesirable consequences in organisa-
tions.  
Further research should be undertaken to study adaptation dynamics by identifying their taxonomy and 
understanding how they overlap, collide and co-construct each other. This should also be extended by 
focusing furthermore on social adaptation dynamics’ build up and inter-actions constituting potentiali-
ties and possibilities (Helin et al. 2014a) and how it leads, sometimes by a very fine grained detail, to 
human actors’ mutual action after social negotiations and bargaining (Emirbayer 1997) seeking sur-
vival and allowing overall co-adaptation. 
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